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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved state-of-the-
art results in various pattern recognition tasks. However, they
perform poorly on out-of-distribution adversarial examples
i.e. inputs that are specifically crafted by an adversary to
cause DNNs to misbehave, questioning the security and re-
liability of applications. In this paper, we hypothesize inter-
class and intra-class feature variances to be one of the rea-
sons behind the existence of adversarial examples. Addition-
ally, learning low intra-class and high inter-class feature vari-
ance help classifiers learn decision boundaries that are more
compact and leave less inter-class low-probability “pockets”
in the feature space, i.e. less room for adversarial perturba-
tions. We achieve this by imposing a center loss [1] in addi-
tion to the regular softmax cross-entropy loss while training a
DNN classifier. Intuitively, the center loss encourages DNNs
to simultaneously learn a center for the deep features of each
class, and minimize the distances between the intra-class deep
features and their corresponding class centers. Our results
on state-of-the-art architectures tested on MNIST, CIFAR-10,
and CIFAR-100 datasets confirm our hypothesis and highlight
the importance of discriminative features in the existence of
adversarial examples.
Index Terms— Adversarial Machine Learning, Robust-
ness, Defenses, Deep Learning
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, machine learning and in particular deep learn-
ing has impacted various fields, such as computer vision, nat-
ural language processing, and sentiment analysis. Regard-
less of their superior performances, these algorithms can be
breached using adversarial inputs: perturbed inputs to force
an algorithm to provide adversary-selected outputs [2]. De-
tailing all adversarial attacks in the literature is outside the
scope of this paper. Hence, we will be providing a brief sum-
mary of different adversarial attacks, defenses and hypoth-
esized reasons behind the existence of adversarial samples.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) was proposed as a fast
method to generate adversarial samples by adding perturba-
tion proportional to the sign of the cost functions gradient [3].
However, using iterative optimization-based attacks, such as
Basic IterativeMethod (BIM) [4], Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) [5], and Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack [6], have become
standard practice in evaluating defenses. Black-box attacks
(e.g. using numerical methods [7] or evolutionary algorithms
[8, 9] to approximate the gradients) are more practical alter-
natives to white-box attacks as they do not assume that the
attacker has access to the model weights or architectures for
generating adversaries. While many effective attack methods
have been proposed [10] e.g. single-pixel [8], Local Search
[11], Houdini attack [12], defending against adversarial ex-
amples (AXs) remains largely an open problem.
Recent approaches for defending against AXs include: (1)
adversarial training [3]; (2) input transformation [13]; (3) reg-
ularization [14]; and (4) detecting out-of-distribution inputs
[15]. Furthermore, there have been contrasting views on the
existence of AXs. Linearity hypothesis, the flatness of de-
cision boundaries, the large local curvature of the decision
boundaries, or low flexibility of the networks are some view-
points on the existence of AXs that do not perfectly align with
each other [10].
Inspired by k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), classifiers that are
trained with center loss [1] learn a center (feature vector) for
each class. Intuitively, softmax cross-entropy loss attempts
to maximize the inter-class distance and center loss attempts
to minimize the distance between the intra-class features.
We hypothesize that minimizing intra-class and maximiz-
ing inter-class feature distances would improve a classifier’s
robustness to AXs. In this paper, we show that DNN classi-
fiers trained with a combination of center loss and softmax
cross-entropy loss (DSC) are substantially more robust to
both white-box and black-box adversarial attacks compared
to classifiers trained with softmax cross-entropy loss alone
(DS). The paper makes the following contributions:
• Across MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets,
our proposed models are more resistant to AXs gen-
erated by state-of-the-art white-box and black-box at-
tacks including PGD, CW, and single-pixel attacks.
• The discriminative center loss when combined with the
adversarial training [3] also improve the DNN robust-
ness compared to vanilla adversarial training (Sec. 3.4).
2. A FEATURE LEARNING VIEW ON ROBUSTNESS
Much of our discussion will revolve around how learning dis-
tinct features improves the adversarial robustness of a DNN.
This study highlights how the approach can be used to achieve
local robustness within the targeted classes. We provide the
key details and notations that will be used in this section.
Notations. LetD(X) = Y represent a DNN used for a given
classification task for any input image X , and Y being the
probability scores over the classes. The DNN maps an image
to a probability distribution over the classes. We define the
feature layer, the layer before the softmax layer, as F . So, the
output probability score for the imageX is given by
D(X) = softmax(F (X)) (1)
The predicted class for the imageX is then given as C(X) =
argmaxiD(xi), whereD(xi) is the predicted class probabil-
ity for class i. The adversarial examples,Xa, are samples that
are adjacent to clean examples but the predicted label by the
network is different, i.e. C(Xa) 6= C(X). We now define the
local robustness for a DNN [16].
Definition 1 A DNND is δ locally robust at point x if
∀xa ||x− xa||
2
2 ≤ δ =⇒ C(x) = C(xa) (2)
Eq. (2) inherentlymeans that the DNN should assign the same
labels to two input samples that are very close to each other,
separated by δ in this case. Instinctively, this means that fea-
tures learned from the same class should have smaller vari-
ance between them or in other words the features should have
small intra-class variance. This gives us the motivation of us-
ing center-loss in addition to the softmax cross-entropy loss
functions for classification. Hence, all our DNN models are
trained using the loss function defined in Eq. (3). For any
input imageXk, the loss function is defined as:
L = −
m∑
k=1
log
e
WTyk
F (Xk)
∑n
j=1 e
WTyj
F (Xk)
+λ
1
2
m∑
k=1
||F (Xk)−Cyk ||
2
2
(3)
where, F (Xk) denotes the feature layer output of the image
Xk with ground truth label yk. Wj ∈ R
d denotes the jth
column of the weights in W ∈ Rd×n in the feature layer.
The respective class centers are updated as the deep features
change and are represented as cyk . The number of images
and classes in the current dataset are denoted by m and n
respectively. The value of λ is taken as one for all our exper-
iments [1]. Eq. (3) corresponds to the fact that features from
the same class should have minimum distance between them
and vice-versa. The local robustness can be now seen as the
distance δ which represents the minimum distance to push a
data point from one cluster to another. We explain this fur-
ther using MNIST dataset [17] as our toy example. Similar
to [1], we train two versions of a LeNet network using ReLU
activation with softmax and a combination of softmax and
center loss separately. Hereafter, we denote a model trained
with softmax loss asDS and the one with softmax and center
loss together asDSC . We train them using stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) optimizer for 60k images and test on 10k test-
ing samples. Additionally, we also used adversarial training
to train both DS and DSC with AXs generated using FGSM
attack with ǫ = 0.3. The adversarial trained models are rep-
resented by DAT S and DAT SC respectively. This choice of
ǫ is the most common one in the context of adversarial ex-
amples and serves as a standard benchmark [3]. Fig. 1 illus-
trates the feature learned by the feature layer (the penultimate
layer) for the models DS (Fig. 1a) and DSC (Fig. 1b). The
results suggests thatDSC learns more robust and discrimina-
tive features as compared toDS . Subsequently, the minimum
δ needed to generate AXs is smaller for Fig. 1a. We validated
this by attacking the trained models using FGSM attack algo-
rithm and found that the performance ofDS andDSC model
falls from 96.95% to 70.34% and from 98.40% to 78.73% re-
spectively. Clearly,DSC has a better adversarial performance
thanDS . This point is further justified from Fig. 1a where the
high variance among intra-class features for the DS model is
observed. One can increase the defensive power of an archi-
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(b) DSC
Fig. 1: Feature Visualization of the penultimate layer. DSC
models results in higher inter-class and smaller intra-class
variance.
tecture by training the networkwith AXs that are generated on
the fly. In Fig. 2, we visualize the features learned byDAT S
and DAT SC . On comparing Fig. 1 and 2, it is interestingly
seen that the inter-class distances become smaller due to the
AXs. After adversarial training of the two models we tested
the trained models against AXs generated using FGSM at-
tack with ǫ = 0.3 and found that the DAT SC still performed
better than DAT S . This initial study (Table 1) solidifies our
hypothesis that learning discriminative features increases the
adversarial performance of a model.
Table 1: Testing and Adversarial performance for the
MNIST(LeNet model) using FGSM attack
Model Testing Accuracy Adversarial Accuracy
DS 96.95% 70.34%
DSC 98.40% 78.93%
DAT S 98.94% 96.08%
DAT SC 98.73% 97.44%
Table 2: Testing and Adversarial accuracy for different datasets, architectures and white-box attacks, such as FGSM, PGD and
CW attack
Datasets Model
Testing Accuracy
Adversarial Accuracy
FGSM Attack PGD Attack CW Attack
DS DSC DS DSC p-val DS DSC p-val DS DSC p-val
MNIST (a) MLP 97.91 ± 0.1% 97.97 ± 0.2% 48.23 ± 5.4% 68.68 ± 3.6%<0.001 0.01± 0.0% 0.08 ± 0.1% 0.002 0.03 ± 0.0% 4.82 ± 0.5% <0.001
CIFAR-10
(b) VGG19 93.42 ± 0.3% 92.36 ± 0.2% 71.91 ± 1.1% 69.56 ± 2.3% 0.054 8.47± 0.2% 27.61 ± 1.4%<0.001 8.98 ± 2.4% 47.06 ± 3.1% <0.001
(c) ResNet18 94.97 ± 0.3% 94.52 ± 0.2% 68.64 ± 2.2% 74.29 ± 1.4%<0.001 0.81± 0.3% 29.26 ± 1.0%<0.001 0.00 ± 0.0% 59.57 ± 7.5% <0.001
(d) DenseNet40 94.37 ± 0.2% 93.91 ± 0.1% 55.44 ± 0.8% 69.92 ± 2.8%<0.001 0.29± 0.5% 23.91 ± 3.5%<0.001 0.00 ± 0.1% 0.18 ± 0.1% 0.006
CIFAR-100
(e) VGG19 73.33 ± 0.2% 69.10 ± 1.5% 40.26 ± 0.5% 38.63 ± 3.2% 0.272 2.93± 1.3% 9.04 ± 2.0% <0.001 8.45 ± 1.7% 23.07 ± 2.5% <0.001
(f) ResNet18 75.13 ± 0.8% 76.91 ± 0.2% 38.46 ± 0.7% 43.43 ± 1.2%<0.001 0.32± 0.2% 5.16 ± 1.3% <0.001 0.0± 0.0% 17.49 ± 1.5% <0.001
(g) DenseNet40 75.85 ± 0.3% 73.78 ± 0.3% 26.36 ± 0.5% 32.08 ± 0.4%<0.001 0.07± 0.0% 1.89 ± 0.4% <0.001 0.00 ± 0.0% 0.75 ± 0.3% 0.002
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(b) DAT SC
Fig. 2: Feature Visualization of the penultimate layer after
adversarial training. The AXs cause the clean image features
to intersect with each other and therefore causing the mis-
classification
3. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Building upon the results from Sec. 2, we now present ex-
tensive results that encompasses state-of-the-art white-box
attacks, black-box attacks, and adversarial training method.
Comprehensive experiments using widely used sequential
and skip-connected architectures, along with popular classifi-
cation datasets, such as MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100,
are used to validate our hypothesis.
3.1. Datasets and Networks
MNIST: The experiments on toy example (Sec. 2) and other
adversarial attacks were performed on the standard MNIST
dataset of handwritten digits. Each sample is a 28 × 28
binary image. The complete dataset comprises of 70k im-
ages, divided into 60k training and 10k testing images. For
pre-processing, we normalize the data using mean and stan-
dard deviation. For MNIST, we use a 3-layer ReLU network
having 200 nodes in each hidden layer, similar to [18], as a
standard MNIST architecture. The network was trained using
SGD for 30 epochs. The initial learning rate is set to 0.1,
and is divided by 10 at 50% and 75% of the total number of
training epochs. No data augmentation was used for MNIST.
CIFAR: CIFAR dataset is a collection of two secondary
datasets, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, consisting 32×32 RGB
images drawn from 10 and 100 classes respectively. Each of
them contains 60k images split into 50k training images, and
10k testing images. We adopt a standard data augmentation
scheme, random crop and flip. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
architectures are trained for 300 epochs respectively using the
same training scheme as MNIST. For our experiments, VGG-
19 [19], ResNet-18 [20] and DenseNet-40-without-bottleneck
[21] models are used.
3.2. White-box attacks
This type of adversarial attacks assume complete knowledge
of the targeted model, including its parameters, architecture,
training method, and in some cases its training data as well.
Adversarial strength is defined by the certainty that the at-
tacking algorithm would generate AXs which will be mis-
classified by the model. PGD and CW attacks are consid-
ered to be white-box attacks with high adversarial strengths.
FGSM, on the other hand, is a quick way to generate low
strength adversaries. In Table 2, we summarize the perfor-
mance of various architectures on these white-box attacks. In
order to statistically validate, we train five different models
for all architectures and perform two sample t-test on the ad-
versarial accuracies between DS and DSC . The p-val in the
table highlights the statistical significance of the results. All
the architectures were trained based on clean examples. Sur-
prisingly in the MNIST results, we see a huge difference in
the adversarial performance between DS and DSC for AXs
generated from FGSM with an increase of≈ 20%. We do not
observe a significant difference for the PGD and CW attacks
as they are very strong attacks and MNIST is a relatively eas-
ier dataset to fool. Despite the testing accuracy ofDSC being
lower than DS , we observe that the adversarial performance
of the former is significantly higher. In general, we get an
increase in adversarial performance throughout all the attacks
and architectures. Notably, for very strong attacks like PGD
and CW, we observe significant increase in adversarial per-
formance for DSC models in the CIFAR dataset results. For
VGG-19 results of PGD and CW attack (Table 2 b–e), we see
Table 3: Testing and Adversarial accuracy for different
datasets, architectures using single-pixel, black-box attack.
Datasets Network
Testing Accuracy Adversarial Accuracy
DS DSC DS DSC p-val
MNIST (a) MLP 97.91 ± 0.1% 97.97 ± 0.2% 95.32 ± 1.5% 94.69 ± 0.9% 0.403
CIFAR-10
(b) VGG19 93.42 ± 0.3% 92.36 ± 0.2% 77.41 ± 0.5% 78.50 ± 0.7% 0.013
(c) ResNet18 94.97 ± 0.3% 94.52 ± 0.2% 84.16 ± 0.1% 84.68 ± 0.5% 0.051
(d) DenseNet40 94.37 ± 0.2% 93.91 ± 0.1% 81.16 ± 0.7% 81.16 ± 0.9% 1.0
CIFAR-100
(e) VGG19 73.33 ± 0.2% 69.10 ± 1.5% 43.02 ± 0.5% 45.01 ± 0.3%<0.001
(f) ResNet18 75.13 ± 0.8% 76.91 ± 0.2% 57.97 ± 1.5% 56.18 ± 0.9% 0.036
(g) DenseNet40 75.85 ± 0.3% 73.78 ± 0.3% 57.13 ± 3.1% 51.38 ± 1.1% 0.005
an increase as high as ≈ 487%. A similar trend is seen in
the case of CIFAR-10 ResNet-18 architecture results where
an increase up to ≈ 500% and in some cases a change from
0% to ≈ 60% (Table 2 c) is observed. Moreover, the p-val
(<0.05) in most of our comparisons statistically proves that
the difference in their performance is significant. One should
note that this increase in performance is achieved without us-
ing any AXs for training.
3.3. Black-box attacks
Black-box attacks generate AXs, during testing, for a tar-
geted model without prior knowledge of model parameters.
Some versions of black-box assume having some knowledge
of the model architecture or the training process but in no
case do they know about the model weights. The black-box
attack performance is evaluated using the same trained mod-
els used in Sec. 3.2. In Table 3, we see a notable difference
in the adversarial performance for black-box attack. DSC
models force the training procedure to learn more discrimina-
tive features. This inherently introduces a trade-off between
the model’s testing and adversarial accuracy. It is clearly
seen, from Table 3 (a, d), that the difference in the adver-
sarial performance for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 cases are
non-significant. Moreover, for a tougher dataset like CIFAR-
100 (Table 3 e–g) we observe the adversarial performance to
be a by-product of the testing accuracy of the architectures
on clean examples. The significant drop in DSC adversar-
ial performance for CIFAR-100-DenseNet-40 is clearly ob-
served as its testing accuracy was lower than the DS models.
We believe regularizing the DSC models, for increasing test-
ing accuracy on clean examples, would further improve their
black-box adversarial performance.
3.4. Adversarial Training
As shown in Sec. 2, adversarial training drastically improves
the adversarial accuracy of any model. The adversarial train-
ing process is a brute-force approach and is very slow because
we generate AXs on the fly. Hence, we choose the best mod-
els for each architecture, from Table 2, and use it for our ad-
versarial training experiments. Table 4 illustrates the testing
and adversarial performance of the previously chosen models
(from Sec. 3.1) when we train themwith both clean and adver-
sarial samples, i.e. adversarial training. For MNIST, we train
the MLP model for 30 epochs with the adversarial samples
introduced on the fly after a delay of 10 epochs. The delay
is important as we make sure that the network first achieves
a decent performance with clean examples and in our case
they achieve 90% of the expected accuracy. We chose BIM
attack for generating AXs during the training because it gen-
erates higher strength adversaries as compared to FGSM and
is faster than CW attack [10]. Interestingly, MNIST, being a
relatively easier dataset, is not affected due to the adversar-
ial training and hence, the adversarial performance ofDAT S
andDAT SC are close. For CIFAR datasets, the models were
trained for 300 epochs and the AXs were introduced after
a delay of 150 epochs. The training using AXs affects the
testing accuracy and hence we see notable difference in the
testing accuracy between Table 2 and 4. After adversarial
training, the models were tested on new AXs generated from
BIM attack and we see a significant difference in their sub-
sequent adversarial performances. Notably, we see a signifi-
cant increase in the adversarial accuracy throughout Table 4.
Even adversarial training does not bridge the adversarial per-
formance gap betweenDS andDSC models in Table 2 as the
latter learns more discriminative features from the AXs too.
Table 4: Testing and Adversarial accuracy for different
datasets and architectures after adversarial training using BIM
white-box attack
Datasets Network
Testing Accuracy Adversarial Accuracy
DAT S DAT SC DAT S DAT SC
MNIST (a) MLP 98.01% 98.69% 94.33% 94.22%
CIFAR-10
(b) VGG19 87.26% 85.89% 61.39% 65.78%
(c) ResNet18 89.30% 88.43% 60.45% 66.10%
(d) DenseNet40 88.19% 86.02% 66.34% 72.59%
CIFAR-100
(e) VGG19 70.10% 69.89% 44.00% 47.85%
(f) ResNet18 70.18% 71.25% 47.68% 49.28%
(g) DenseNet40 69.19% 68.30% 44.48% 35.86%
4. CONCLUSION
In this work, we hypothesized that one of the possible rea-
sons behind the poor adversarial performance of the state-of-
the-art deep learning architectures are their lack of learning
discriminative deep features. We bridged that gap by using a
combination of softmax and center loss function and then per-
formed a comprehensive set of experiments to successfully
substantiate the effectiveness of our hypothesis. We plan to
further investigate in this direction to propose defense mech-
anism for deep learning models.
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